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The Internet, it seems, causes trouble. In the short time that this
global computer network has been publicly accessible, it has begun to
challenge past notions of jurisdiction,' begun to require a re-thinking
of free speech,2 has created a panic over intellectual property,3 and
now threatens to re-write the rules of commerce for a new digital
marketplace. 4  Because the technological underpinnings of the
network violate the assumptions embedded in many current legal
doctrines, certain legal mainstays have proven inapplicable to the
Net, at least in their current form.5 This places new and unusual
stresses on previously settled rules of law.6
* Copyright 1999 by Dan L. Burk. All Rights Reserved. Portions of this article were
presented at the symposium on Information, National Policies, and International Infrastructure
sponsored by the Harvard Law School and John F. Kennedy School of Government, January
29, 1996. The author wishes to thank Julie Cohen, Michael Froomkin, Jack Goldsmith, Roberta
Katz, Brian Kahin, Mark Lemley, Larry Lessig, Jerry Riechmann, and Pamela Samuelson for
their comments on previous drafts of the article.
** Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University.
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CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
In nature, organisms faced with new or unusual stresses display
two primary modes of response: they attempt to alter the situation, or
they attempt to escape it. Biologists term these choices "fight or
flight."'7 A version of "fight or flight" occurs in response to social
stresses as well, where the responses have been labeled as "voice" and
"exit."'  Citizens or consumers may respond to some situations by
exercising voice: that is, by using votes, publications, speeches, or
other signaling devices to express complaints or compliments about
the circumstances. At other times, citizens or consumers may
respond by "exiting," that is, by abandoning an unsatisfactory
situation to seek a more favorable circumstance. In some instances,
"exit" may take the shape of an actual physical migration to another
locale; in other situations, "exit" may simply mean abandoning one
brand of a product for another.
Exploration of these responses to social stimuli has prompted a
rich scholarly literature exploring how individuals choose "voice" or
"exit" as a reaction to political or economic choices. 9 But as a
practical matter, it has long been apparent that real-world costs erect
barriers to the exercise of either option. Access to "voice" through
traditional print or broadcast media is expensive, 10 and at the same
time, the costs of physically migrating to a new home may be
prohibitive for the majority of people." Particularly in the case of
"exit," the distortions caused by such cost barriers have hampered
efforts to fully develop a theory of interjurisdictional competition. 2
7. KENT M. VAN DE GRAAF, HUMAN ANATOMY 399, 429 (2d ed. 1988).
8. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970).
9. See, e.g., Rudolf Klein, Models of Man and Models of Policy: Reflections on Exit, Voice
and Loyalty Ten Years Later, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 416 (1980); Lena Kolarska &
Howard Aldrich, Exit, Voice, and Silence: Consumers' and Managers' Responses to
Organizational Decline, 1 ORG. STUD. 41 (1980); Jagdip Singh, Voice, Exit, and Negative Word-
of-Mouth Behaviors: An Investigation Across Three Service Categories, 18 J. ACAD.
MARKETING SCI. 1 (1990). See generally Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:
Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contributions, 58 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 430
(1980).
10. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995).
11. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional
Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 233-34 (1997);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political Economy of Local Government,
in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS 55, 56 (George R. Zodrow ed., 1983); see also David E. Wildasin & John D. Wilson,
Imperfect Mobility and Local Government Behavior in an Overlapping-Generation Model, 60 J.
PUB. ECON. 177, 180-81 (1996) (discussing how governments may attempt to capture rents from
aging, less mobile citizens who cannot exercise the option to exit).
12- See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 11, at 231-35.
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The Internet, however, radically lowers such cost barriers,
creating new opportunities for individuals or firms to migrate from a
less favorable market position to a more favorable one. The option
to exit an unfavorable market is closely tied to the option of voice, as
entities attempt to use political processes to shift the market in one's
favor. 3 I take as my thesis the proposition that the Internet will
facilitate both voice and exit, by lowering the cost for each. 14 As a
consequence, the advent of the network offers an unprecedented
opportunity to explore the interplay of and ramifications of these
strategies. Other commentators have already addressed the likely
effects of "cheap voice. ' 15 Here I shall focus on the effects of "cheap
exit." I shall argue that because it allows almost costless migration of
digitized goods, the Internet will promote international competition
in two distinct but interrelated markets. By thus facilitating both
business and consumer "exit" in the market for digitized goods, the
Internet will reshape the market for national and international
information policy.
This intermarket dynamic has important ramifications for our
understanding of regulatory spillover between markets. Competition
may exist at different levels: at the level of nations, firms, or
individuals. These competitive arenas are not independent, and a
change in one may initiate changes in the others. Taking copyright
law as my example, I shall principally argue that the Internet will
facilitate competition among firms for information products, and so
among nations for intellectual property regulation. These types of
competition are closely linked, and the impact of the Internet on
international competition for information products will cause a type
of "market cascade" that will affect international competition for
regulation. Information policy operates in both markets, although I
shall show that it is a cost in one market, but a product in the other. I
hope to show that the option of "virtual exit" may facilitate
externalization of costs at all market levels, potentially undermining
efficiency gains from increased competition, and this result may be
generalized to other areas of information policy besides intellectual
property. This in turn will require a reconsideration of the proper
13. See id. at 236-39.
14. Cf. David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in
Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L., $1 40-44 (Oct. 20, 1998) <http://warthog.cc.wm.edu/law/
publications/jo~lpost.html> (noting the Internet's facilitation of exit).
15. See generally Volokh, supra note 10.
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legal mechanisms to control such losses. I shall begin by discussing
the technological milieu that has created the present situation.
I. THE NEW TECHNOLGY
When considering the advent of the Internet, we are confronted
with a familiar pattern of events. We might say that in the march of
progress, technology leads the way; law tries to keep pace, but is
generally found in the rear, limping a little. 16 The impact of the
Internet on information technology threatens to leave information-
related law playing "catch-up" yet again. This profound effect that
the Internet promises to have on competition for information and its
related regulation arises from certain technical features of networked
communications. These features include packet-switching,
decentralization, and geographic transparency, which together
challenge our previous notions of cost and distance.17
A. Technical Characteristics
The first of the Internet's technical peculiarities lies in its design
as a "packet switching" network. 18 Internet communication channels
are not dedicated in real time to a single transmission, as occurs in
conventional telephony, broadcast, and other prior media.19
Information to be transmitted along the network is broken into
discrete packets of bits that are labeled with the address of their final
destination.20 Packets are referred along their route from computer to
computer. The packets are sent on their way as transmission capacity
becomes available, and are reassembled at the point of receipt.21
Thus, packets from a variety of sources may share the same channel
as bandwidth allows, promoting more efficient use of available
carrying capacity. 22
A second critical feature of the Internet is its employment of
"smart communications." Because the Internet is a network of
16. See Sir Zelman Cowen, In the Rear and Limping a Little: Some Reflections on Medicine,
Biotechnology, and Law: The Roscoe Pound Lectures, 64 NEB. L. REv. 548 (1985).
17. See generally Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Economic FAQs About the
Internet, in INTERNET ECONOMICS 27, 33-38 (Lee W. McKnight & Joseph P. Bailey eds., 1997).
18. See Vinton G. Cerf, Networks, SCI. AM., Sept. 1991, at 72, 74.
19. See id. at 74.
20. See NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 180-81 (1995).
21. See id. See generally MacKie-Mason & Varian, supra note 17.
22. See Cerf, supra note 18, at 74.
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computers, silicon intelligence is available at every node of the
network to control the flow of packet traffic. The design of the
Internet takes full advantage of this characteristic. Computers at each
node monitor traffic on the network, and route packets along the
least congested path to the next node. From there, the process is
repeated.23 In addition to spatial ordering, temporal ordering may
also be employed to effectively use the available channels: a
computer that receives packets may choose to hold them until traffic
clears.
As a consequence, packets comprising a single message may take
different paths at different times to their final destination. 24 At first
consideration, this method might seem a recipe for chaos. There is no
central coordination of traffic, but only independent routing and
sequencing decisions by local computers. However haphazard this
process may seem, the sum of the many independent local routing
decisions moves packets along the most efficient route as if by an
"invisible hand." And, in addition to efficient channel usage, the
Internet's lack of central coordination has an additional important
implication: there is no central point at which to monitor, restrict, or
censor information flow.
Finally, as might be expected from the nature of packet-
switching, the Internet is relatively transparent to physical distance.25
Originally designed to promote sharing of scientific equipment and
information resources, the network hosts a variety of features that
permit remote access to such facilities. 26 Internet users can access
computers and information across a continent or around the world as
easily as they can access resources in the next room-indeed,
depending upon local network traffic, accessing the distant facility
may prove to be faster and more responsive. 27 So insensitive is the
network to geography that it is frequently impossible to determine
the physical location of a resource or user.28 Such information is
unimportant to the network's function or to the purposes of its
creators, and the network's design thus makes little provision for
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 57-58 (1995).
26. See EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW: YOUR
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD 5-9 (1994).
27. See NEGROPONTE, supra note 20, at 178.
28. See id. at 194; WILLIAM MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS 8 (1996).
19981
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geographic discernment.2 9
B. The Virtual Marketplace
The technical characteristics of the Internet are rapidly being
applied toward creation of a "virtual marketplace. '"30 Consumer
transactions are becoming an increasingly important feature of
Internet communications. At present, commercial traffic on the
network usually culminates in an exchange of physical goods. In this
type of exchange, the network acts much like a glorified mail-order
catalog. Consumers may select, order, and even pay for goods on-
line, but tangible goods cannot be sent over a fiber-optic cable.31 The
goods must be shipped to the consumer, and the legal structure of
such transactions is not appreciably different from past mail-order or
telephone-order business.
The expansion of commerce on the network, however, is leading
to entirely new forms of transaction that will be shaped by the unique
features of the network described above.32 The Internet already
supports user access to a wide variety of information utilities such as
databases and computational facilities, as well as archives of text,
music, graphics, and software. 33 Information and information-based
services on the network have traditionally been offered for free, but
will increasingly be offered on a commercial basis.34 Unlike the
purchase of physical goods through the network, the on-line purchase
of informational commodities requires no shipment of physical goods.
Transfer of digitized information products such as music,
photographs, novels, motion pictures, multimedia works, and
software can be accomplished entirely within the network itself.35
Consequently, the Internet can serve as an international conduit
for the purchase and delivery of digitized informational commodities.
Such information products already occupy a critical position in the
29. See generally MITCHELL, supra note 28.
30. See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean, 15 J.L. & COM.
395, 449-50 (1996).
31. See NEGROPONTE, supra note 20, at 12-13.
32. See Froomkin, supra note 30, at 450.
33. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Copyrights in Digital Information, in ONLINE LAW: THE
SPA'S LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET § 9.3 [hereinafter ONLINE LAW]
(Thomas J. Smedinghoff ed., 1996) (listing various types of digital works available on-line).
34. See CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 26, at 33.
35. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Online Law: What's New and Different?, in ONLINE LAW,
supra note 33, at 3-4.
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economies of developed nations, and will likely occupy an
increasingly important position in the world economy. 6 Simply as a
technology that will increase the exchange of such products, the
Internet would be a subject worthy of careful scrutiny. But the
Internet will do more than simply facilitate delivery of information
products: the network's capacity to exchange such products on-line
will challenge certain established notions of market structure. This in
turn will affect the structure of firms that conduct business on-line,
and ultimately, the law governing all these entities as well.
1. Spatial Distribution of Firms
The features of the Internet described above dictate that the
characteristics of on-line commerce will differ substantially from
those previously familiar in exchange of tangible goods. In particular,
behavior of firms and consumers in the virtual marketplace will not
follow conventional models of regional economic organization that
were developed to describe and predict the exchange of tangible
goods in real space. Such analyses of regional structure draw heavily
on the distributional model pioneered by August Losch, which
predicts the spatial distribution of production centers or cities as a
function of economic factors. 37
Loschian analysis bases production center distribution on a
combination of proximity to production input factors and proximity
to points of product sale to consumers. 38  The question of
transportation costs is key to such an analysis. At a boundary point
some certain distance from the central production facility,
transportation of raw materials into the production facility becomes
prohibitive.39 Similarly, at a boundary point some certain distance
from the production center, transportation costs limit the edge of the
spatial market that can be served by that center.40 Where these
boundaries intersect, a new production facility can be expected to
36. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ELECTRONIC
ENTERPRISES: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 13-15 (1994) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC
ENTERPRISES].
37. See AUGUST LOSCH, THE ECONOMICS OF LOCATION (W.H. Woglom & W.F. Stopler
trans., Yale Univ. Press 1954).
38. See M.J. Beckman, Outline of a Theory of Regional Structure, in THE ANALYSIS OF
REGIONAL STRUCTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF AUGUST LOSCH 8 (R. Funck & J.B. Parr-
Karlsruhe eds., 1978) [hereinafter REGIONAL STRUCTURE].
39. See R. Sohns, Losch and the Theory of Trade, in REGIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note
38, at 119, 122-24.
40. See id.
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arise, becoming the focal point of a new "cell" of production and
market activity. 41 The economic influence of each production center
is bounded by the territorial extent of its geographic "cell."
Historical examples of such centers are relatively common. For
example, the city of Abilene grew up at the border where the
practical limit of cattle drives ended, and railroads began. 42 Similarly,
Chicago's meat packing plants grew up at the border where the
practical limit on movement of live animals ended, and shipment of
processed meat began. 43 But commercial exchange over the Internet
can be expected to violate the Loschian model, as the characteristics
of the Internet obviate certain assumptions inherent in this regional
analysis. The most important of these superseded assumptions is that
transportation costs for finished goods increase with distance. This
assumption is plausible in real space, where expenditures of fuel and
other resources are required to move tangible goods over geographic
distances." The type of goods best suited to Internet commerce,
however, are information goods carried in digitized form. Such
arrangements of bits lack the physical form that generates
conventional marginal transportation costs. Such costs essentially
disappear for electronically delivered information goods.45
This is not to suggest that transfer of information goods over the
Internet is costless. The transfer requires telecommunications
infrastructure that has finite bandwidth. 46 The packet-switched design
of the network bears testimony of this limitation, as an attempt to
deal with problems of congestion. Congestion may occur as a result
of limited physical infrastructure, or in extreme cases, as a result of
the practical limits of the capacity of computers that provide packet
switching and routing capability. Congestion may also be created by
local regulatory structure -access fees or other tariffs unrelated to the
actual usage.47 Alleviating such congestion, either through additional
41. See id.; Beckman, supra note 38, at 9.
42. See JOHN A. HAWGOOD, AMERICA'S WESTERN FRONTIERS 317, 322-23 (1972).
43. See DONALD L. MILLER, CITY OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC OF CHICAGO AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICA 58-59, 96 (1966).
44. See NEGROPONTE, supra note 20, at 4.
45. See William H. Lehr & Martin B.H. Weiss, The Political Economy of Congestion
Charges and Settlements, in THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: SELECrED
PAPERS FROM THE 1995 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 79, 80
(Gerald W. Brock & Gregory L. Rosston eds., 1996).
46. See id.
47. See generally HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
§ 7.1, at 301 (1996).
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capacity or through technological innovation, may be costly.48
However, the critical point regarding information products is that
once network infrastructure is in place, the marginal cost of sending
an additional packet approaches zero. This is not the case for
physical goods, where even after a highway, airline, or other physical
transportation system is in place, each additional unit carried requires
additional expenditures of fuel, maintenance, and so on.
Moreover, incremental transfer costs on the Net are not simply
vanishingly small: they are not tied to geographic proximity. This
uncoupling of cost and geography stems from the lack of homology
between cyberspace and real space. As discussed above, Internet
transfers do not necessarily map well onto physical distance: rather
than choosing the most direct route, a packet-switching network will
route information transfer via the least congested route. This makes
highly efficient use of bandwidth, but is not necessarily the shortest
physical route-contrary to conventional models of spatial ordering,
choosing the shortest distances between sender and receiver might
actually increase costs. This, together with the overall "transparency"
of the Net with regard to physical distance, suggests that a regular
spatial distribution of Internet production centers is unlikely: the
economic constraints that dictate location of such centers in real
space are absent or radically altered in cyberspace.4 1
2. Location and Migration
Thus, the Internet largely frees centers for production of
information goods from the location constraints inherent in physical
transportation costs. This suggests that such production centers will
instead locate according to the dictates of other economic constraints.
But, as in the case of transportation limits, such constraints are
unlikely to be traditional physical limitations. Neoclassical economics
predicts that industries will locate on the basis of the "comparative
advantage" of particular locations.5 0 Such advantages might include
proximity to transportation, availability of raw materials, or access to
48. See Padmanabhan Srinagesh, Internet Cost Structures and Interconnection Agreements,
in TOWARD A COMPETITIVE TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE
1994 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 251, 257 (Gerald W. Brock ed.,
1995) (noting that physical infrastructure involves significant sunk costs).
49. See NEGROPONTE, supra note 20, at 163.
50. See ROBERT S. PINDYK & DANIEL L. RUBENFELD, MICROECONOMICS 597-99 (2d ed.
1992).
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skilled labor.51 For example, the development of the computer
industry in "Silicon Valley" has been attributed to the close proximity
and interaction of skilled labor and venture capital in the San Jose
region.5 2 Proximity of such inputs is one of the L6schian constraints
on spatial distribution, and just as in the case of proximity to
consumers, this constraint dwindles in importance where the Internet
is concerned. First, the Internet makes physical proximity less
important because the "raw materials" that go into creating finished
information goods differ in mobility from those of traditional
industries. Computer code, digitized music or text, and numerical
data require no costly physical transportation, but can be transmitted
over the Net. In addition, the labor inputs for such production may
be provided by Internet linkage-creative people from around the
globe can work on information products without being physically
close to one another, or to the base of product distribution. 3
This means that information production can potentially relocate
to almost any nation on the globe. Unlike industries where heavy
equipment must be centrally located to create manufacturing
facilities, the equipment involved in information production is
relatively mobile. A few thousand dollars worth of computer
equipment will quickly put an Internet information supplier on-line,
and such equipment tends to be highly portable. The necessary
inputs, if not available locally can largely be supplied via Internet
link.14 Someone must of course be available to keep the computers
running, but skilled technical support personnel, if not available
locally, are equally mobile or accessible on-line.5 Local availability of
telecommunications infrastructure may pose a real constraint on
choice of operational venue,56 but increasingly sophisticated Internet
linkages are expected to become available in most parts of the
51. See id.; ROGER SCHMENNER, MAKING BUSINESS LOCATION DECISIONS 37-38, 149-54
(1982).
52. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994).
53. See NEGROPONTE, supra note 20, at 228; see also Jaikumar Vijayan, Look Out, Here
Comes India, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 26, 1996, at 101-02 ("Satellite links, dedicated phone
lines, E-mail, the Internet, and videoconferencing hookups give off-shore programmers the
same kind of access to their customers' hardware as U.S.-based employees.").
54. See ELECTRONIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 36, at 32; NEGROPONTE, supra note 20, at
165-66.
55. See Vijayan, supra note 53.
56. See Narander Ramparu et al., Issues in Foreign Outsourcing: Focus on Applications
Development and Support, INFO. SYS. MGMT., Spring 1997, at 27, 29.
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world. 7
This degree of production mobility and decentralization does not
mean that information creators and providers will not choose to
locate on the basis of comparative advantage. Quite the contrary,
local conditions will continue to have a powerful effect on the choice
of location for information industries. However, the mobility
afforded by Internet conduits may drastically change the type of
advantage that assumes prominence in the choice. Location decisions
for real-space businesses have been strongly effected by proximity to
markets, labor, and transportation.58 Beyond these factors, producers
of physical goods and real-space services may choose their location on
the basis of factors unrelated to proximity of inputs or consumers.
Direct subsidies, local tax structure, environmental regulation,
municipal services, and quality of life play important roles in the
decision to locate traditional industries.59  These secondary
considerations will similarly affect the decision to locate information
industries that are otherwise relatively unconstrained as to location.
Thus, one might imagine the case of a software developer who
takes advantage of the mobility of the Internet by incorporating
subsidiaries in various jurisdictions, say, the United States, Korea,
India, and Poland. Code is written in the United States, and is then
shipped via Internet to another jurisdiction, where the cost of labor is
lower, for time-consuming debugging, after which it is shipped back
to the United States. The lower costs of labor might include lower
base salaries, no unions, relaxed occupational safety requirements, or
other local comparative cost advantages. 60 The developer may even
arrange this multinational work schedule so that the code is worked
on continuously-i.e., U.S. engineer works on it until 5:00 p.m., ships
it to Korean engineers who start working on it at 9:00 a.m. and finish
at 5:00 p.m., ship it to Indian engineers who do the same, and so on
around the globe.61
57. See Russell Daggat, Satellites for a Developing World, SCI. AM., Sept. 1995, at 94.
58. See John R. Moore et al., The Efficacy of Public Policy, in INDUSTRY LOCATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY 257,269 (Henry W. Herzog & Alan M. Schlottmann eds., 1991).
59. See SCHMENNER, supra note 51, at 152.
60. See Ramparu et al., supra note 56, at 28. Foreign outsourcing, or "body shopping" of
software applications development has already become extremely common for this reason, with
about 43% of U.S. software firms taking advantage of foreign comparative advantage in skilled
labor. Id. at 29.
61. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Seven by Twenty-Four, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 26, 1996, at 102
("In addition to cost and quality, Indian companies are leveraging.., the 10 -hour time
difference between India and the U.S., which allows them to run cost-effective, seven-day-a-
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Note that in such an example, the types of "comparative
advantage" factors that affect firm relocation frequently fall into the
category of public goods and services. Factors such as tax and
environmental regulation are largely the legislative creations of local
governments-the products of a legal or regulatory comparative
advantage. Where information industries are concerned, the class of
regulations most directly affecting the creation and distribution of
their products may be intellectual property laws. For example, the
developer may choose to write the initial code in the United States in
order to take advantage of the protection of U.S. patent or trade
secrecy law. Alternatively, a software developer may take advantage
of legal comparative advantage by setting up her operation in a
jurisdiction where it is permissible to decompile code or otherwise
reverse engineer it, use the knowledge gained to build a
non-infringing product, and then offer that product via the Internet
for sale into jurisdictions where the reverse engineering act itself
would have been an infringement. We may therefore expect that a
jurisdiction's "intellectual property" comparative advantage may
assume considerable importance in determining the physical location
of information producers. The regulatory options available to nations
arise from the nature of information itself.
II. INFORMATION PRODUCTS
As described above, the technical characteristics of the Internet
will shape the growing global market for information products. But
the initial contours of the information market are set by
characteristics of the product traded: information. Information has
long been known to have a "public" character that requires the
peculiar forms of regulation we call intellectual property law. The
Internet amplifies and enhances this "public" character of
information, and in so doing can be expected to perturb previous
paradigms of intellectual property regulation.
A. Production of Public Goods
Current positive and normative theories of intellectual property
owe much to analysis of public goods as formulated nearly half a
century ago by Paul Samuelson.62 Samuelson observed that there are
week, 24-hour operations.").
62- See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. &
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certain classes of "goods" that are public in nature, that is to say,
which are non-rival and non-exclusive. A good such as "national
defense" provides a now-classic example: it is non-rival because,
unlike tangible goods, a unit of national defense may simultaneously
benefit more than one person. 63 It is non-exclusive because, again
unlike most tangible goods, once a unit of national defense is
produced for the benefit of one individual, it is nearly impossible to
prevent others from simultaneously benefiting from its production.64
Because public goods are non-exclusive, there may be little
incentive for anyone to be willing to pay for their production. 65 The
optimal strategy for a given consumer would be to let someone else
pay for production, and then, because he cannot be excluded from
consuming the good, "free ride" off of what is produced. 66 Naturally,
if everyone adopts this strategy, no one will pay at all and no good
will be produced. 67 At the same time, because public goods are non-
rival, the marginal cost of providing the benefit to additional
consumers is zero or nearly zero.68 This means, first, that it would
actually be inefficient to exclude additional consumers from enjoying
the good, even if a method could be devised to do S0. 69 But it also
means, second, that there is little if any incentive to produce more
than one unit of the good because everyone can simultaneously hold
the first unit.70 This combination of attributes is anticipated to lead to
chronic underproduction of public goods in a competitive market.7'
Information products tend to resemble Samuelsonian public
goods in many respects. In their purest form, information products
are at least non-rival-ideas, facts, songs, and poems can be "held" or
known by many people simultaneously.72 The cost of distribution for
such pure information products or "ideal goods" is also close to zero;
STAT. 387 (1954).
63. See PINDYK & RUBENFELD, supra note 50, at 661-62.
64. See id.
65. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
66. See PINDYK & RUBENFELD, supra note 50, at 665.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 661.
69. See ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION:
COMPETITION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 100 (3d ed. 1983).
70. See Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in
Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
209, 219 (1985).
71. See PINDYK & RUBENFELD, supra note 50, at 664-65.
72. See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 69, at 100.
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telling an idea to another individual is generally a fairly low-cost
proposition.7 3 However, this is not true non-exclusivity, as in the case
of a "pure" public good like national defense-unlike additional
consumption of national defense, additional consumption of an ideal
good can be curtailed by concealment or secrecy.74 Nonetheless, ideal
goods are sometimes said to be "non-exclusive" because they are very
cheap to reproduce. Each consumer of an ideal good becomes a
potential source of secondary distribution, and proliferation of such
secondary sources at some point causes the availability of ideal goods
to approach true non-exclusivity. 7
Intellectual property law almost never protects ideal goods in
their ideal form. Fundamental tenets of patent and copyright law
forbid the protection of ideas or principles; rather, the specific
embodiment of the idea in, respectively, an invention or a tangible
medium of expression is protectable. 76 The embodiment, such as a
book, painting, or compact disc, can be held by only one person at a
time. The embodiment thus has the characteristics of a private good;
it is rival and excludable. 77 The intellectual property embedded in the
embodiment loses some of its public character, and more closely
resembles what might be called a local public good rather than a
"pure" or general public good.78
For example, even though different copies of a copyrighted work
can be held simultaneously by more than one individual, a particular
copy is limited to a discrete physical location.79  This quality of
intellectual property differs substantially from that of a classic
Samuelsonian public good such as national defense, which is
embodied at no discrete situs. The non-rival nature of the protected
work therefore lies in the ability to generate multiple copies, rather
than in the diffuse or inchoate nature of the work.80 Additionally, the
physical embodiment of the work is subject to the constraints of
physical distribution. The work is therefore only as non-exclusive as
shipping constraints allow.
73. See Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 70, at 219.
74. See PERRrrr, supra note 47, § 10.2, at 420.
75. See Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 70, at 218.
76. See 17 U.S.C. §102(b) (1994); Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
77. See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 69, at 101.
7& See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five Years After
Tiebout: A Perspective, in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE TIEBOUT MODEL
AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, supra note 11, at 17, 19.
79. See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 69, at 101.
80. See PERR1TT, supra note 47, § 10.2, at 419.
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Most information products are not in fact ideal goods, but are
rather ideal goods embodied in some tangible form, such as compact
disks, books, magnetic tape, and so on."' Such embodied goods
cannot be reproduced as effortlessly as ideal goods, nor distributed as
effortlessly as ideal goods.82  Because the non-rival aspect of
embodied ideal goods is in fact an artifact of reproducibility, control
of reproduction could serve as a choke point in the availability of the
good. If reproduction cannot be restricted, distribution of the
physical copy may be. Restriction of reproduction and distribution
allows the controller to extract a higher price for access to the goods.
Such restrictions can be used to counteract the tendency to
undersupply such goods.83
Copyright law, for example, uses this physical "bottleneck" as a
point of control to allow authors to recoup their investment in
creative works. Copyright extends only to works embodied in a
tangible medium of expression,84 but it grants to authors the exclusive
rights to reproduce, distribute, and similarly exploit such embodied
works. 85 Unauthorized reproduction or distribution is discouraged via
legal penalties. Thus the copyright holder is able to sell copies or
licenses to copy at an artificially-but necessarily-inflated price.86
By restricting reproduction and distribution of information goods,
creation is fostered.87
However, technology has tended to greatly enhance the "non-
exclusivity" of information products by lowering the cost of
reproduction.88 From hand-copied manuscript to printing press to
photocopy to floppy disk, the reproduction bottleneck exploited by
copyright is widening. 9 The Internet takes this trend a step further,
not only by facilitating digital reproduction, but by allowing cheap
distribution. By pushing the marginal cost of distribution close to
zero, the Internet enables dissemination of information products that
is highly efficient-some might argue too efficient.9 0 The Internet
81. See Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 70, at 217.
82. See Landes & Posner, supra note 65, at 329.
83. See id.
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
85. See id. § 106 (1994).
86. See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 69, at 101, 292.
87. See Feist v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
88. See PER~rrr, supra note 47, §10.1, at 416-17.
89. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTrENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 32-33 (1994).
90. See Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 70, at 215.
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both makes information resources available to distant users and
facilitates distribution of digitized information products at a cost that
approaches that of an ideal good.91 As described above, such efficient
distribution enhances the "pure public goods" nature of information
products, allowing free riders to reap the external benefits of
information producers, and potentially undermining incentives to
produce the goods in the first instance.92
B. Production and Distribution
The artificial price structure imposed by copyright regimes are a
key consideration in understanding the interaction of nations that
produce informational goods, and those that are said to "pirate"
informational goods. Copyright distributional restrictions generate
incentives to produce informational goods, but at the price of
curtailing distribution.93  Pirate nations attempt to encourage
maximum distribution of a work by circumventing copyright
restrictions that would inflate the work's price. This restrictive effect
creates something of a paradox for intellectual property: jurisdictions
that encourage "piracy" are in fact encouraging a type of efficiency,
whereas jurisdictions with stringent copyright laws are encouraging a
type of inefficiency. 94
This paradox may be in part resolved by considering that these
strategies are actually directed to different phases in the life cycle of
an information product.95 Creation of information products, like the
creation of other products, may be conceived of as comprising several
phases. An initial phase may involve generation of the information or
creative work. 96 A subsequent phase may involve "adding value" to
the work through processing, tagging, verifying, indexing,
standardizing, packaging, or similar "institutionalization." 91 Yet a
third phase involves distribution or dissemination, which will
91. See Pamela Samuelson, Copyright, Digital Data, and Fair Use in Digital Networked
Environments, in THE ELECTRONIC SUPERHIGHWAY: THE SHAPE OF TECHNOLOGY AND LAW
TO COME 117, 119 (Ejan Mackaay et al. eds., 1995).
92. See id. at 120.
93. Cf! Martyne M. Hallgren & Alan K. McAdams, The Economic Efficiency of Internet
Public Goods, in INTERNET ECONOMICS, supra note 17, at 455, 460-61 (discussing asymmetric
pricing of public goods).
94. See Landes & Posner, supra note 65, at 333.
95. See Karen B. Levitan, Information Resources as "Goods" in the Life Cycle of
Information Production, 33 J. AM. SOC'Y INFO. 44 (1982).
96. See id. at 46.
97. See id. at 47.
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generally include reproduction of the work.98 Each of these phases
may entail considerable cost, and each may be thought of as
generating a separate "good": raw information resources, "value
added" information resources, and information products or services.
Each of these separate information goods exists to some extent
in its own market, although the markets are interconnected: the good
from each successive phase is an input to the next phase, leading
eventually to distribution of information products. As noted above,
copyright law has tended to use the bottleneck in the distribution
phase to allow authors to recoup the costs of their creative investment
in either the generation or institutionalization phases. Thus, stringent
control of a work tends to promote production, but at the cost of
inefficient distribution. Jurisdictions adopting restrictive copyright
regimes thus foster efficient production, whereas jurisdictions
adopting permissive copyright regimes foster efficient distribution.
Both approaches tend toward efficiency, but only at one particular
stage in the product's life cycle.
This tension between approaches has long been apparent in the
copyright systems adopted by different jurisdictions. Developed
nations, such as the United States, have tended to focus on restrictive
copyright regimes that promote production of creative works.9 9 Other
nations, typically underdeveloped nations, have tended to focus on
permissive regimes that promote distribution to their populace at the
cheapest cost. °° These two approaches to some extent focus on
different markets-either generation or distribution-however,
attempts to maximize efficiency in one market entail a loss of
efficiency in the other. From these competing interests charges of
"piracy" are born. Efficient distributors must still have something to
distribute-most frequently, permissive regimes have distributed
unauthorized copies of works fostered under restrictive regimes.
Physical barriers have tended to keep the effect of pirating
localized, thereby allowing concurrent existence of production-
oriented and distribution-oriented regimes. Unauthorized copies of
works have tended to circulate within a given nation or region, but
generally not globally in sizeable quantities. This tendency toward
98. See id.
99. See Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the
Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 113-14 (1995).
100. See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 104 (1993).
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localization arises from the non-ideal nature of the works at issue;
recall that copies of works embodied in tangible media tend to
resemble local public goods rather than general public goods. The
physical copies have bulk, weight, and other characteristics that make
them costly to transport. In a L6schian system, these characteristics
impose limits on efficient distribution. Transportation costs across
geographic distances will naturally curtail the circulation of physical
copies.
Other barriers to circulation may be interposed to frustrate low-
cost transborder distribution. For example, by hiring customs
inspectors, sizeable shipments of infringing works entering a
"producer" nation can be interdicted at a point of entry.10 1 Creation
of such a public interdiction capability could perhaps be viewed as a
national investment in barriers; by preventing a flood of cheap
foreign copies, domestic production is fostered. But as with any other
trade barrier, one must also recognize that it is a public subsidy to
information product producers-the public pays both the cost of the
customs service and the inflated prices charged by the protected
information producers. 102
The Internet, as we have seen, threatens to drastically change the
calculus of distributional costs. Unconstrained by the transportation
assumptions of a L6schian system, the Net allows information
products to be distributed without the costs commonly associated
with transporting physical goods over distance. This aspect of the
network threatens to breach the regional compartmentalization
previously associated with information piracy. Distance and
transportation costs may no longer pose a significant barrier to
distribution of unauthorized copies of a work. The network
potentially extends the reach of information pirates, transforming
regional permissive distribution into global permissive distribution.
Additionally, because of the Internet, interdiction of infringing
products may become nearly impossible. The Internet, as we have
observed, lowers marginal costs, including artificially created
marginal costs. As a practical matter, the sheer volume of Internet
traffic would make it prohibitively time consuming to examine each
101. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Summary Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights at the Border: Customs Law and Practice, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 429
(1993).
102. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 635 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing
tariff effects).
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packet coming into the territory of a copyright restrictive nation, and
to sort among them for potentially infringing copies. Infringing
packets might enter a territory at almost any point on the border, via
microwave broadcast, fiber-optic, or copper wire transmission, or
satellite downlink. Even if all the packets in all these media were
monitored, works traversing the Net are likely to be broken into
multiple packets that may be simultaneously routed through a variety
of entry points. The Internet's feature of piecemeal transmission
could thus further obscure a determination of whether the final re-
assembled transmission would be an infringing work.
The result is that the compartmentalization that protects
production-oriented regimes may fail. National borders of restrictive
copyright jurisdictions will be rendered highly porous to delivery of
cheap information products from permissive copyright jurisdictions. 13
Infringing information products that formerly had the character of
local, or at least regional, goods, may be freed from their physical
embodiments and suddenly begin to resemble true general public
goods. The Internet will therefore act not merely as a product
delivery system that will free information producers to relocate where
they will because they no longer require close proximity to
information consumers; it will simultaneously act as a conduit for
externalizing the costs of local information regulation choices.
III. LAW PRODUCrS
We have seen that the Internet, by rendering the delivery of
information products geographically transparent, will shape the type
of intellectual property regime that nations may select. By shaping
such regulatory choices, the Internet will impact not only the market
for information products, but a second, less well recognized market
for information product regulation. Implicit in the prediction that
some nations will become "digital pirates" or "copyright havens" is
the assumption that nations compete for business revenues by
creating local regulatory comparative advantages. 1°4 The dynamics of
such interjurisdictional competition are dependent upon the public
nature of such regulations, and just as the Internet enhances the
public character of intellectual property, so does it similarly enhance
the public character of intellectual property law.
103. See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1498.
104. See id.
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A. Local Public Goods
It is at this point that Samuelson's insight into the nature of
public goods again plays a critical, albeit corollary, role in analyzing
the informational market effects of the Internet. Samuelson's
observations regarding under-production of public goods did not go
long without an answer.15 In 1956, Charles Tiebout published his
now-classic paper modeling local provision of public services on a
theory of interjurisdictional competition that closely resembles
market competition for provision of private goods. 1°6  Tiebout
theorized that if citizens are free to migrate between jurisdictions,
competition for desirable citizen immigrants will arise. 107  Local
communities will offer to potential immigrants the most attractive
packages of goods and services at the lowest tax rate possible08
Similarly, migrants will relocate to jurisdictions offering the maximum
package of public goods at the tax rate that the migrant is willing to
pay.109 Local communities may even tailor their offerings to appeal to
particular types of immigrants, and immigrants would be expected to
sort themselves out into groups of similar means and tastes by
jurisdiction."0
The production of local public goods and services might thus
resemble the production of private goods in a competitive market:
competitive pressure from other jurisdictions will prevent any given
jurisdiction from offering too much or too little in the way of public
services."' Jurisdictions that offer too much will experience an influx
of immigrants from less generous jurisdictions; jurisdictions that offer
too little will experience an exodus to more generous jurisdictions."2
Migration in or out of the jurisdiction will continue until parity with
competing jurisdictions is reached."13 These forces therefore act as a
check on overproduction or underproduction of local public goods.
105. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 11, at 55.
106. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
107. See id. at 418-20.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 422.
110. See Martin McGuire, Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions, 82 J. POL. ECON.
112 (1974).
111. See Stiglitz, supra note 78, at 18.
112. See id.
113. See George J. Stigler, Economic Competition and Political Competition, 13 PUB.
CHOICE 91, 93 (1972).
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By "voting with their feet," or exiting, citizens force efficiency in
allocation of resources to such goods. 114
The Tiebout model, like most pure economic theories, rests upon
a number of simplifying assumptions. The model assumes that voters
have full knowledge of the package of local services offered in various
jurisdictions, that there are a large number of jurisdictions from which
to choose, that individual mobility is relatively unconstrained, and
that communities have an optimal size which will be dictated by the
balance between resource constraints and economies of scale."5 Most
important for this discussion, the Tiebout model assumes that
jurisdictions are tightly compartmentalized so that no external costs
or benefits accrue from the local provision of public services.116 If
jurisdictions are "leaky," then individuals could perhaps enjoy the
positive benefits of a neighboring jurisdiction's policy without actually
incurring the cost of migrating there."7 More significantly, in a world
of leaky borders, jurisdictions could lower the costs to local firms by
imposing all or part of those costs on neighboring jurisdictions." 8
This would serve to attract firms, but not necessarily by generating a
net gain in efficiency.
Ironically, this final assumption implies that even on its own
terms, the Tiebout model is an inadequate answer to the problem of
inefficient production of Samuelsonian public goods."9  If all the
necessary assumptions are in place for operation of the Tiebout
model, then the problem of Samuelsonian goods is not addressed. 12
The Tiebout model applies only to allocative efficiency of local public
goods, that is, production of public goods that are local in nature,
having no external effects. However, Samuelsonian public goods are
almost always general public goods, that is, true public goods whose
effects are not locally circumscribed. For such goods, allocative
efficiency will not arise through interjurisdictional competition,
because the positive or negative external effects will be felt outside
the jurisdiction. Tiebout competition will arise only where public
goods can be securely compartmentalized.
114. See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 126-27 (1979).
115. See id.
116. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 71, 83 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
117. See Stiglitz, supra note 78, at 48.
118. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw 5-6 (1993).
119. See Stiglitz, supra note 78, at 47.
120. See id.
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B. Law as a Product
Business firms were not part of Tiebout's original model, but his
insight was quickly expanded to encompass strategic preferences of
local governments regarding such firms. Just as in the
consumer/citizen model, businesses too may vote with their feet,
locating their operations in jurisdictions that offer the most attractive
set of local public goods.' 21 This in turn implies that jurisdictions may
tailor their offerings to attract businesses, or to attract certain kinds of
desirable businesses, or even to repel undesirable businesses. 122 In
this market for business migration, the "price" of migration may take
a variety of forms: jurisdictions may offer anything from tax
incentives, land grants, and liability waivers to museums, sports
arenas, and public transportation systems.123
However, in analyzing business migration, we face a problem not
encountered with persons. 24 The "location" of a business is a
problematic question, because unlike an individual consumer, a
business may have no discrete situs of existence-offices may be in
one physical location, manufacturing in another, distribution in
another, and sales in yet others. To the extent that a business as a
juridical person is "located" anywhere, it may be located in the state
of incorporation. Certainly the law governing the state of
incorporation has a profound effect on the rights and structure of the
organization.12' As a consequence, one might expect that local laws
governing incorporation might attract or discourage incorporation
under those laws, and that jurisdictions might compete for the
benefits-i.e., taxes and fees-to be garnered from incorporation
franchises. 126
This type of competition, in fact, appears to occur under certain
conditions, giving rise to the so-called "Delaware phenomenon."' 127 It
is fairly widely recognized that in the United States, a surprisingly
121. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON.
23, 29 (1983).
122. See id. at 43; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a
Federal Republic, 89 J. POL. ECON. 152, 157 (1981).
123. See Albert Breton, The Existence and Stability of Interjurisdictional Competition, in
COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY 37, 42 (Daphne A.
Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
124. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 608 (1980).
125. See Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 34, 35.
126. See POSNER, supra note 102, at 416.
127. See ROMANO, supra note 118, at 6-11.
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large number of corporations choose to incorporate or re-incorporate
under the laws of the state of Delaware. 128 The proper explanation
for this phenomenon is less well settled than is the observation itself.
Analyses of the phenomenon tend to fall into two broad schools of
thought. The first of these schools, originally set out by law professor
William Cary, suggests that competition for incorporations represents
a "race to the bottom," that is, a race to liberalize incorporation law
for the benefit of officers and directors.12 9 By enacting laws to appeal
to the interests of officers and directors, states may attract
incorporations, but at the expense of shareholders' rights. As states
vie with one another for incorporation franchises, they successively
liberalize their laws, until the rights of shareholders are entirely
subordinated. 10 Cary recommended federal intervention to halt what
he perceived as a downward spiral of ruinous interstate
competition."'
The second school, which coalesced in response to Cary's claims,
questions whether shareholders would in fact be stupid enough, or
oblivious enough to their own interests, to leave their investment
dollars with firms incorporated under laws detrimental to the
shareholders' interests. 13 2  If jurisdictions such as Delaware were
subordinating shareholder rights, one might expect to see
shareholders "vote with their feet" by abandoning Delaware
corporations for firms incorporating under laws more favorable to
investors. Such a loss of investment dollars to Delaware corporations
might in turn provide an incentive for firms not to incorporate there.
The fact that there appears to be no such migration of investors from
Delaware firms, or of firms from Delaware itself, leads commentators
of the second school to - interpret Delaware's success in attracting
franchisees as indicating that such incorporations are attractive to
investors, probably due to the superior returns on investment
received from such firms.
This latter analysis suggested that Delaware, far from winning a
128. See id.
129. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
130. See id. at 665.
131. See id.
132. See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy
Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to
the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76
Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 917 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and
the Theory of the Corporation, J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
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"race to the bottom" for inefficient incorporation laws, had won a
''race to the top" for efficient incorporation laws that permitted
maximum returns to investors. A subset of the "race to the top"
school, typified in the writings of Roberta Romano, particularly
emphasized the Delaware phenomenon as a competition between
jurisdictions for "law as a product. ' 13 3 Delaware may not necessarily
have attracted the lion's share of incorporations because of the
absolute superiority of its governing rules, but because the Delaware
legal system has specialized in corporate law, offering additional
certainty to firms seeking incorporation. 4 Thus, Delaware offers not
merely a highly developed statutory system, but also a court system
with a high degree of expertise in resolving corporate conflicts, as well
as a considerable body of case precedent governing such conflicts. 135
Thus, these scholars argue, the total package of Delaware's legal
capital succeeds in the incorporation marketplace as a superior
product. Subsequent studies have suggested that interjurisdictional
competition for law as a product operates in areas besides
incorporation, such as bankruptcy law.136  Such studies suggest a
strong analogy between the competition among jurisdictional legal
systems and the competition among private parties in a market for
tangible goods.137 In private markets, buyers "exit" by switching to
other brands that are cheaper, better, or more desirable. 138  In
interjurisdictional law "markets," firms may virtually exit by changing
their place of incorporation. Or, as the Tiebout model predicts, they
may physically exit by changing their geographic location.
However, not every kind of law can compete in the
interjurisdictional marketplace. Interjurisdictional market failure
may occur if externalities cannot be contained-that is to say, if the
effects of the law in question are not localized. This problem quickly
becomes apparent when considering law other than incorporation law
that affects businesses. For purposes other than incorporation,
businesses may be present almost anywhere that transactions are
133. See ROMANO, supra note 118; Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
134. See ROMANO, supra note 118, at 38.
135. See id. at 39-40.
136. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 201 (1996) (empirical study indicating that jurisdictions compete for desirable immigrants
by offering absolution from former debts).
137. See Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 28.
138. See id. at 34.
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conducted. Because a firm's presence is physically diffuse rather than
physically discrete, certain types of legal regulation will not constitute
local public goods with regard to a firm in a given jurisdiction. For
example, a firm that manufactures a given product may be subject to
tort liability in a large variety of jurisdictions -the place where a tort
occurs will weigh heavily in a legal conflict of law analysis to decide
which jurisdiction's law should apply to the question of liability3 9 No
matter where a firm's central offices are located, or where its
manufacturing facility is located, it is the place where its goods are
sold and used that will determine its liability for injuries caused by its
goods. 14
0
Consequently, we would not expect local tort regulation to
appreciably affect where most businesses locate their headquarters or
manufacturing facilities. No matter where the firm locates, the law of
personal injury in that jurisdiction will at best cover injuries in the
workplace - a minuscule part of most firms' overhead. 141  The
majority of a firm's tort liability is likely to accrue where it sells its
products. Tort law may therefore have a profound effect on where
the business decides to sell or not sell its products, but not on location
of its facilities. Thus, with respect to the business' decision to locate
facilities in a given jurisdiction, tort law is not a local public good, that
is, it is not a public good whose effects are circumscribed to a discrete
geographic region. Instead, choice of law analysis transforms tort law
into a general public good that spills over the borders of any given
geographic region to reach businesses incorporated and
headquartered in other jurisdictions. This violates the Tiebout model
requirement regarding externalities, and frustrates the creation of a
"market" for manufacturer law.142
Conversely, we would expect corporate chartering, and not tort
law, to be the type of "law product" that choice of law regimes will
treat as geographically sited, and hence amenable to
interjurisdictional competition. In the United States, recognition of
such legal status has been formalized as a requirement under the Full
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §136 cmt. h (1969).
140. Cf. C. Robert Morris, Jr., Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 574 (1961) (noting that insurance rates are based
on where an automobile is housed rather than upon the domicile of the owner or driver).
141. An exception might occur when the firm is engaged in the manufacture of dangerous
commodities, such as chemical manufacture. In the event of a serious accident, local tort
liability might appreciably affect the firm's profits. Knowing this, the firm would take the
expected costs of such an accident into account in locating its facility.
142. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 11, at 231.
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Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution. 143  But even
where such a formal federal agreement does not exist, mutual
recognition will tend to arise, generating international competition
for corporate charters, or international competition for marine vessel
registries. Corporate chartering and other recognitions of legal
status, such as marriage 14 or vessel registry,145 will tend to comprise
unbundled legal products that are not connected to particular
physical items, and which are not connected with significant external
costs. While competing jurisdictions need not necessarily as a matter
of law recognize legal status conferred by a competitor, in practice
jurisdictions will be under considerable competitive pressure to
engage in mutual recognition of such nominally sited legal
relationships. One can imagine a situation in which some nations
decline to recognize a particular legal status, such as citizenship in
another nation. Under such a regime, tourism and even trade with
those nations would likely be deterred, as domiciliaries of one nation
were subjected to multiple conflicting requirements of taxation,
military service, jury duty, and so on.146 Such losses, coupled with the
threat of retaliatory treatment of their own citizens would tend to far
exceed any benefits, including administrative fees, that nations would
gain from their non-acquiescence.
Tort liability, by contrast, comprises a bundle of public and
private goods that may entail significant cross-subsidies between
jurisdictions. 147 Liability in fact comprises a type of legal status; when
a manufactured product crosses the border between jurisdictions, it
may change legal status from safe to defective. Jurisdictions are
unlikely to treat the status of the product according to the law of its
jurisdiction of origin, in part because the physical damages that a
defective product inflict at the place of the tort will tend to tip the
cost-benefit calculus in favor of imposing the local liability status.
Additionally, jurisdictions that fail to enact protective tort regulation
will tend to find that they are effectively subsidizing payment of
143. See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1; see also Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222
(1998) (outlining limits of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
144. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 11, at 266 n.263 (citing Nevada divorces as "the
primary example").
145. See generally Jane Marc Wells, Comment, Vessel Registration in Selected Open
Registries, 6 MAR. L. 221 (1981) (discussing vessel registration states).
146. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 11, at 273 (discussing costs of complying with
diverse regulatory schemes across jurisdictions).
147. See David A. Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (1985).
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damages in jurisdictions that do-that is, the cost of products sent
into the less protective jurisdiction will reflect the cost of liability
imposed in protective jurisdictions, but the less protective
jurisdictions will not be sharing in any portion of that higher price in
the form of recovered damages.148
The market dynamics for law products also indicate which types
of jurisdictions are likely to compete in the market for nominally sited
legal relationships. The jurisdictions that have tended to compete
most successfully for corporate charters, or vessel registries, or bank
deposits, are relatively small jurisdictions such as Delaware,
Singapore, Liechtenstein, or various small island nations.1 49 These
jurisdictions will tend to have fewer physical resources as compared
to larger jurisdictions. However, because the generation of law
products is not a type of production that requires economies of scale
efficiency, small jurisdictions can compete in the law market as easily
as large jurisdictions.150 At the same time, the income generated by
competing in a law market may form a significant portion of a small
jurisdiction's revenues-for example, Bratton and McCahery note
that although fifteen percent of Delaware's tax base is drawn from
corporate franchise fees, this same cash flow would form a trivial
percentage of a larger state's tax base.151
C. The Market for Intellectual Property Law
In contrast to regulation that has the characteristics of
Samuelsonian public goods, other types of regulation that have the
characteristics of local public goods may potentially affect the
location of a business' physical facilities. Tax requirements,
particularly property taxes, as well as state environmental regulation,
worker safety, and employee benefits requirements will all tend to
have localized effects, permitting a market in such law "products."
The question might be posed as to whether the effects of intellectual
property law "products" will tend to be localized, like those of
incorporation law, or diffuse, like those of tort law. Most especially,
the question must be posed as to what effect, if any, the Internet may
have on the localization or externalization of intellectual property law
148. See id. at 49.
149. See Wells, supra note 145, at 236-38 (discussing vessel registration in Singapore); S.
REP. No. 99-130, at 29-36 (1985) (discussing banking haven states).
150. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 11, at 273.
151. See id. at 267.
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as a product.
The answer appears to be that the externalizing effects of the
Internet on the market for intellectual property law may be as
profound as its externalizing effects on the market for intellectual
property itself. Much as in the case of corporation or bankruptcy law,
jurisdictions may be expected to compete in producing intellectual
property law; as suggested above, some may adopt a creation-
fostering stance, others a distribution-fostering stance. As also
suggested above, distance and border control have previously kept
these differing approaches compartmentalized, allowing competition
between permissive and restrictive regimes. However, the Internet
breaks down that compartmentalization, allowing the effects of
permissive regimes to be felt in nations with restrictive regimes. This
effectively allows permissive regimes to lower regulatory costs at the
expense of restrictive regimes, and spells the end of an efficient
Tiebout type competition in information law.
Although this effect might be characterized as a "race to the
bottom" for intellectual property law, the discussion above suggests
that it is better thought of as simply "a race to externalize."' 15 2
Jurisdictions may adopt a permissive information distribution regime
in order to attract distributors, but the Internet expands the market of
such low-cost distributors globally to the territories of restrictive
jurisdictions. The availability of low-cost information from off-shore
sources may disrupt the restrictive jurisdictions' attempt to foster
information generation. In order to compete with the off-shore
source, domestic providers may have to lower prices to a level at
which the creators of information products cannot recoup their
investment costs. This potentially puts information production into a
death spiral of lowered prices and lower production, ending in the
type of underproduction predicted by Samuelson for classic public
goods.153
It may therefore seem that a permissive intellectual property
policy is suicidal for information distributors on the Internet. By
undercutting incentives for information generation and
institutionalization, they would seem to pronounce their own death
sentence. In the past, physical distance and national
compartmentalization allowed such permissive regimes to function,
152. See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and
Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 73 (1993).
153. See generally Samuelson, supra note 62.
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but as the Internet ties previously isolated markets together, a
permissive strategy may ultimately prove self-defeating. In this sense,
the permissive strategy constitutes a form of "Prisoner's Dilemma"
scenario.5 4 The Prisoner's Dilemma comprises a one-round game in
which two parties must independently choose between cooperating
with the other party or defecting; that is, attempting to profit at the
expense of the other party.'55 The pay-offs in the game are arranged
so that if both parties cooperate, they will gain a modest benefit; if
both parties defect, they will both be worse off; and if only one party
defects, that party will gain a substantially larger benefit than it would
gain by cooperating. In such a situation, there is a strong temptation
to choose the large payoff at the expense of the other party. 156
However, if each party thinks this way, both will end up worse off
than if they had cooperated. 157 Similarly, in choosing between a
permissive copyright regime and a restrictive one, it may appear
advantageous to let other jurisdictions bear the cost of production,
but if all jurisdictions adopt this strategy, no production will occur. 58
Nonetheless, we might well expect permissive regimes to
continue engaging in such potentially destructive behavior. The
"Prisoner's Dilemma" game model predicts the existence of situations
in which the players' apparently rational choices lead to a suboptimal
outcome. 59 Theories of international cooperation predict that, much
as in the "Prisoner's Dilemma" scenario, a nation will remain party to
a cooperative agreement only to the extent that the agreement is
"self-enforcing," that is, only so long as the nation has more to gain
from cooperation than from defection.16 °  Because the Internet
transforms local public goods into general public goods, efficient
production of the goods will only occur when consumption decisions
154. See Post, supra note 14; see also R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND
DECISIONS, 95-102 (1957) (explaining the "Prisoner's Dilemma" game theory scenario).
155. See DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 28-29 (1990). The
colorful title of this game derives from an narrative embodiment in which a prosecutor offers
two suspected criminal conspirators the opportunity to testify against the other in exchange for
lighter prison sentences that meet the pay-off criteria of the game. See id. at 37-39. For
application of the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario to intellectual property markets, see Wendy J.
Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 853 (1992).
156. See Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy:
Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226, 230-31 (1985).
157. See id.
158. See Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 38. See generally Post, supra note 14.
159. See ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY 28-29 (1989); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 3 (1987).
160. See Lester Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 (1980).
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are made jointly between nations. 161 But when linked together by the
Internet, no nation has an incentive to adopt a production centered
scheme unless every other nation does so-and, in fact, every nation
may have strong incentives to "defect" from such cooperation in
order to externalize its regulatory costs at the expense of others. 162
IV. COMPETITION OR COLLUSION
The analysis to this point has described the type of market
failures that may occur due to Internet externalities. Because the
Internet straddles intersecting markets in public goods, competitive
failure in the market for intellectual property law may lead to failure
in the market for intellectual property. In terms of the Tiebout
model, the optimal number of jurisdictions may be one, because of
the spillover effects from multiple jurisdictions. 163 This is a corollary
to the principle that where competitive market failure occurs, it may
be that more coordinated behavior is required to compensate.
However, coordinated behavior will only be a superior alternative if a
cooperative equilibrium is possible, that is, a type of coordinated
response where all the parties are better off. Coordinated behavior
may be an inferior solution if it leads to collusion, that is, to activity
where some group of players is made better off at the expense of
other players. And in the coming global information economy, the
line between cooperation and collusion may prove very fine.
A. Cooperative Agreements
In order to find possible solutions to self-defeating political and
commercial incentives in the virtual marketplace, we must carefully
consider the conditions leading to such incentives. Simple game
analysis, such as the "Prisoner's Dilemma" scenario, indicates that in
a "wired" world, national self-interests may lead to undesirable
international outcomes. But games in the real world are rarely so
simple. For example, the "Prisoner's Dilemma" scenario assumes
that the players are unable to communicate with one another, and
that the game is a single-round interaction.164  Because the
161. See MUELLER, supra note 114, at 13.
162. See Trachtman, supra note 152, at 76.
163. See Stiglitz, supra note 78, at 47 (discussing the optimal number of jurisdictions for pure
public goods).
164. See PINDYK & RUBENFELD, supra note 50, at 476.
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information held by the players in the scenario is limited, and because
their interaction is limited to a single event, they are subject to a kind
of "bounded rationality."'165 If their time horizon were lengthened, or
if they knew more, their perception of self-interest would change, and
they would act differently to avoid the sub-optimal outcome. 166
Nations are not necessarily constrained by these assumptions.
Opportunities for negotiation arise with some frequency, and the
"players" in the international market know that they will interact
again in the future.167 This latter knowledge may be especially
significant, as studies of multi-round games have suggested that
cooperative strategies tend to dominate such tournaments, and so
cooperative strategies may be the preference of rational actors in
international competition. 68  Repeated interaction may lead to
"trust," where trust comprises mutual recognition of the strategic
advantage of cooperation. 169
Additionally, the "Prisoner's Dilemma" assumes only two
players-in the international arena there are far more than two
players. In an iterated game with a large number of players, it does
not necessarily follow that if one player defects, the others should
follow suit.70 By remaining in a cooperative agreement, the majority
of players will continue to enjoy the benefits of the agreement, even if
a small number of players free-ride or defect. 7 ' Rather than lose
those benefits, they may choose to ignore the defection. This may
mean that, at least in some situations, a small number of free-riders
will be unable to induce a "race to the bottom.' 17 2 Of course, it may
165. The concept of bounded rationality essentially recognizes the constraint of imperfect
information; individuals make decisions within the parameters of available information, time,
and processing capacity. See Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in 2 MODELS
OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 408,
410-11 (1982).
166. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 12 (1984); DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 173-74 (1994).
167. See John E. Chubb, How Relevant is Competition to Government Policymaking?, in
COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY, supra note 123, at
57-58.
168. See AXELROD, supra note 166, at 136-39.
169. See James S. Coleman, Recontracting, Trustworthiness, and the Stability of Vote
Exchanges, 40 PUB. CHOICE 89 (1983).
170. See Russel Hardin, Economic Theories of the State, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
CHOICE: A HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 21, 29-30.
171. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MICROBEHAVIOR 217-19 (1978).
172. See id.; TAYLOR, supra note 159, at 104. Taylor argues, however, that a partial
cooperation will survive in the face of defection only under certain constrained conditions that
create games within games. See id.
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also mean that a small number of players can "free-ride" indefinitely
on the benefits generated by the cooperative group. But if such
cooperation could evolve among competitors in the market for
intellectual property regulation, the "race for externalization" via the
Internet might be avoided even if some nations choose to become
"pirates."
1. Cooperative Failure
Although the international situation is more complex than that
predicted in single-round game models, the additional complexity
may also add barriers to cooperation. Certain serious barriers dim
the prospects for an international cooperative equilibrium. The first
such problem arises from the obvious fact that governments are
comprised of people, and people do not remain in the same position
forever. At minimum, exercise of "voice" through internal elections
will periodically change the identity of those representing the
nation. 73 Cooperation between nations may be a multi-round game,
but, at least so far as nations with democratic process are concerned,
it is a game in which the players change every few rounds.
Cooperative relationships may be exceedingly difficult to maintain
under such conditions, because the time horizon for exit of a
particular player is finite. 174 If an agreement is concluded with a
player who may shortly leave the game, then the value of the
agreement becomes uncertain, whereas the value of cheating on the
agreement is known. 175 This difficulty is to some extent blunted by
organizational mechanisms within governments that promote
continuity. However, reversals of a nation's international information
policy may be as frequent as the elections of a chief executive or
majority of the legislature.
A second barrier to intergovernmental cooperation is to some
extent a corollary to the first: nations are not monolithic. Whereas
the game scenarios considered above assume a single rational
decisionmaker, the behavior of nations is far more complex. In the
case of nations, external policy reflects the sum of the thousands of
individual strategic decisions that comprise the nation's internal
politics. 76  In other words, governments do not have interests;
173. See Breton, supra note 123, at 38, 49.
174. See id.
175. See PINDYK & RUBENFELD, supra note 50, at 478-79.
176. See Chubb, supra note 167, at 60-61.
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individuals do. Where the state is concerned, the individuals
furthering their own interests are politicians, and politicians are
engaged not simply in a competitive game with their international
counterparts, but with domestic voters as well. 177 This latter game will
frequently prove to be the more influential factor in intellectual
property policy; despite the importance of the Tiebout insight, voting
with one's feet need not always eclipse voting with one's ballot. As
discussed above, a jurisdiction that wished to win the "race to the
top" for international information production might be required to do
so at the expense of domestic information consumers. Thus, the
highly restrictive intellectual property rules necessary to satisfy
information producers could be unacceptable to domestic voters, who
would see prices for access to domestic information products rise. If
such dissatisfaction were manifest at the ballot box, that jurisdiction's
ability to ensure attractive profits for information producers could be
stymied. Additionally, if domestic voters are aware of competing
policies in other jurisdictions, they may use this information to gauge
the performance of their domestic leaders and demand comparable
policies.178  Failure to implement such policies may result in
disgruntled constituents exercising voice by removing local politicians
from office, rather than exiting.
Thus, voice may be as important as exit in the calculus of
intellectual property law production. 179 However, some voices may be
louder than others. Public choice theory suggests that because of the
dynamics of democratic voting, domestic legislatures may be subject
to capture.180 Capture occurs when special interest groups essentially
control voting in an elected legislature. This result will tend to occur
to the extent that politicians are rational in the economic sense; that
is, that they pursue their own self-interest in one fashion or another:
by cultivating fame, by accumulating wealth, or by advancing their
own perception of a better society.1 1 In general, such goals will tend
177. See Roland Vaubel, A Public Choice View of International Organization, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 27, 30 (Roland Vaubel & Thomas
D. Wilbert eds., 1991).
178. See id.
179. See Chubb, supra note 167.
180. Public choice theory is defined as "the economic study of non-market decision making,
or simply the application of economics to political science." MUELLER, supra note 114, at 1.
181. This assumption of public choice analysis has been criticized by a variety of
commentators, but the criticisms ultimately fail to disprove the fundamental conclusions of such
analysis. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic
Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 801,
830 (1997) ("In the end, however, critics qualify rather than question the conclusions of public
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to be furthered by re-election or by election to a higher office, but
politicians may be responsive to special interests rather than to the
general populace, because the marginal value of an individual vote is
almost nil, and voters in democracies may tend to be rationally
ignorant or even rationally indifferent to the electoral process.182 The
average voter's ability to affect the outcome of an election may not be
worth the time investment to become an informed voter. 183 It may not
even be worth a voter's time to cast a vote.184
In the face of such indifference, representative governments may
be captured by "rent-seekers," that is, special interest groups who,
unlike the average voter, find that it is worth their time to attempt to
influence government. 185 Generally, such rent-seeking groups will
seek special interest legislation that benefits them, but which may not
be efficient for society generally. 1"6 Politicians may be able to
accommodate such special interests by engaging in wealth transfers
from the general public to rent-seekers if the burden on the public is
sufficiently diffuse that no member of the public is likely to undertake
an investigation. 187
The influence of such special interest lobbyists in the formulation
of domestic intellectual property laws is both ubiquitous and well-
choice theory."); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 43 (1991) (public choice critics "do not disprove the point that...
special interest groups ... exercise disproportionate political influence").
For example, some commentators have argued that the assumption of rational self-interest
fails to appreciate the altruism and ideological commitment of many politicians. See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873,
890-900 (1987). However, the subjective motivation of an elected representative is immaterial
to the analysis; a politician may be responsive to special interests whose goals could be
considered laudable, or to special interests whose goals might be considered base, but in either
case, to the extent that the representative's incentives are not consistent with general welfare,
the dynamics of legislative behavior will tend to produce the result described here.
Perhaps more importantly, the assumption of self-interest is intended to model aggregate
behavior, not to explain individual behavior. Whether or not the members of legislatures in fact
act to maximize their own self-interest, legislative models may be more accurate when
constructed as if they do. See Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, Predictive Power and
Choice Among Regimes, 93 ECON. J. 89, 97 (1983).
182. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 207-67 (1957).
183. See id.
184. See POSNER, supra note 102, at 526.
185. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J.
224, 232 (1967).
186. See id.; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
187. See David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and
Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 341 (1994).
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documented.118 An explanation of current intellectual property laws
does not necessarily require resort to theories of exit in
interjurisdictional competition; a public choice account of domestic
interests would seem adequate.1 9 In the past, increases in the level of
domestic intellectual property protection have not necessarily been
curtailed by the threat of exit-the United States, for example, has
historically responded to extraterritorial copyright piracy not by
loosening domestic law, but by exerting diplomatic and economic
pressure on the permissive jurisdiction to tighten its copyright
requirements. 190 In an Internet world, the interest groups that forged
the present intellectual property environment can be expected to
continue to attempt to influence policy to their advantage.
2. The Threat of Exit
The potential for legislative capture suggests that the electoral
voice mechanism may sometimes break down, in part from the agency
costs involved in representative democracy, and in part from a type of
Prisoner's Dilemma effect in the dynamics of large groups. Since
each voter faces disincentives to gathering information about activity
of elected representatives, all voters collectively suffer. 191 This stems
not only from the marginal value of a vote, but from the perverse
reward structure of voting. In voting against an incumbent
representative, voice becomes a type of exit: much like switching
brands in the marketplace, voters may switch candidates and cast
their vote for a new representative. However, there are important
differences between marketplace exit and voter exit. Consumers
usually reap an immediate benefit, in the form of lower price or
188. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV.
275 (1989).
189. Public choice analysis of domestic copyright policy is inherent in the discussion of
special interest politics by recent commentators. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right
to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 32 (1994) (attributing recent copyright proposals to
special interest lobbying); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134,
137-38 (same).
190. See Administration Trade Policy, Hearing of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103rd Cong.
(1993) (statement of Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative) (protecting intellectual
property has been a major concern in U.S. trade negotiations with China, Japan, and other
nations); Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age
of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465 (noting importance of intellectual
property in U.S. agenda for trade negotiations); see also Amy E. Simpson, Note, Copyright Law
and Software Regulation in the People's Republic of China: Have the Chinese Pirates Affected
World Trade?, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 575 (1995) (detailing history of United States
attempts to bring China into intellectual property protection compliance).
191. See POSNER, supra note 102, at 525.
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better quality, from switching brands. 192  But the same is not
necessarily true with regard to switching representatives: the next
election may be some time away, and the exit of an individual
consumer has essentially no effect on the outcome of an election.
Thus, in a democracy, the benefits of voice are often delayed and
diffuse. 193
The benefits of jurisdictional exit, however, are more likely to be
immediate and concentrated, making it an attractive alternative
where the requirements for Tiebout competition are met. The threat
of such exit may also tend to work in favor of efficient provision of
local public goods, especially when combined with the threat of
domestic voice. The availability of more attractive regulatory regimes
abroad may attract industry out of a jurisdiction, putting politicians in
that jurisdiction under considerable voter pressure to streamline
domestic regulation. 194 Politicians faced with a net emigration of firms
or citizens may be inclined to enact more efficient local regulation to
stem the tide of departure, or to avoid it completely. The threat of
exit thus forces regulators to set the price of regulation closer to the
competitive interjurisdictional "price."195
This reasoning indicates that there is implicit in the Tiebout
model an answer to the problem of capture that is predicted by public
choice theory. 96 A nation that faces stiff extraterritorial Tiebout
competition cannot afford the drag of such inefficient legislation that
may occur when politicians respond to favored special interests.
Inefficient special interest legislation may prompt overregulated
businesses to exit the jurisdiction, and such exit may provide electoral
sanctions to counteract the legislative tendency toward capture. As in
the case of firms in private markets, nations may be forced to become
more efficient in order to compete for desirable businesses.
Jurisdictions will generally have two options in developing such a
competitive set of law products: regulating better and regulating less.
In some instances, law products may do well in the legal market
because they embody true regulatory innovation, but more often,
rules may be made competitive by paring away inefficient special
interest regulation.
192. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 187, at 337.
193. See id. at 337-38.
194. See id.
195. See Breton, supra note 123, at 40.
196. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEcTIVE AcTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
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What this means for information policy is that stiff
interjurisdictional competition to attract information providers and
distributors may help to keep local politicians honest. Public choice
analysis suggests that politicians will engage in an international race
to attract information providers only to the extent such activity
furthers the politicians' personal or political goals. 197 Some degree of
intellectual property bottleneck is desirable to maintain creative
incentives, but information producers in a given nation may attempt
to influence local law so as to allow producers to reap monopoly
profits beyond those necessary to prompt creation. Because the
Internet facilitates efficient distribution of informational products,
such rent-seeking will simply facilitate the exit of distributors.
Nations competing with other jurisdictions in the market for
intellectual property law will have to avoid special interest
boondoggles, or watch new industries migrate offshore to compete in
the information product market.
Recent proposals for amending the U.S. copyright laws appear to
provide a concrete example of this effect.198  The proposals, drawn
from a Department of Commerce "White Paper," have been
criticized as heavily favoring information producers at the expense of
information distributors and consumers. 99 Several commentators
have suggested that these proposals are in fact the result of "rent-
seeking" by powerful entertainment and publishing lobbies.5°
However, assuming that this perceived bias is real, it is difficult to see
how such domestic proposals would assist the rent-seekers in the face
of international competition. The proposals, if enacted, would allow
special interests to seek higher prices for the information products
they produce. But the Internet would simultaneously allow lower
cost distributors to migrate off-shore to more permissive jurisdictions,
and by delivering their goods on-line, undercut the inflated domestic
197. See Vaubel, supra note 177, at 31.
198. See H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995). Similar legislation was
re-introduced in the 105th Congress. See H.R. 2282, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1121, 105th Cong.
(1997).
199. See Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299 (1996); Leslie A.
Kurtz, Copyright and the National Information Infrastructure in the United States, 18 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 120 (1996); Charles R. McManis, Taking TRIPS on the Information
Superhighway: International Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer
Technology, 41 VILL. L. REV. 207 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights and
the Global Information Economy, COMM. OF THE ACM, Jan. 1996, at 23. For rare favorable
treatment of the proposals, see Ginsburg, supra note 3 and Gary W. Glisson, A Practitioner's
Defense of the White Paper, 75 OR. L. REV. 277 (1996).
200. See Litman, supra note 188; Samuelson, supra note 189.
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content prices. This in turn would force the beneficiaries of the
legislation to lower their prices, negating the effect of the proposals.
This theory of the "White Paper" proposals would predict that,
because of foreign competition for both law products and information
products, the rent-seekers' only hope to protect their proposed
prerogatives would be to seek homogenous international
enforcement of the proposals. This prediction in fact fits the
currently available data; the same Clinton administration bureaucrats
who championed the proposals in the United States have vigorously
advocated the same proposals before a diplomatic World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO"), seeking their widespread
adoption. 21  And of course at this juncture, a "cooperative"
international intellectual property agreement may resemble
cooperative equilibrium less than it resembles anticompetitive
collusion in a private sector cartel.202
B. Collusion
The analysis thus far indicates that the presence of barriers to
cooperative international behavior must be recognized as a very
mixed blessing. The very forces that tend to prohibit cooperation in
one setting are the same forces that generate an efficient law market
in another setting-if in some situations barriers prohibit beneficial
coordinated action, they may preclude detrimental coordinated action
in others. International adoption of uniform intellectual property
standards might serve to avoid the race to the bottom for intellectual
property producers. But because of the public goods nature of
intellectual property, in preventing the race to the bottom in producer
standards, an international agreement may also cripple the race to the
top in distribution standards. Such a cure may be no better than the
201. WIPO is an agency of the United Nations whose mandate includes promoting
international harmonization of intellectual property standards. See generally SAM RICKETSON,
THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-
1986 (1987) (discussing international role of WIPO). In December of 1996, a new treaty
amending the Berne Convention was adopted under the auspices of a WIPO diplomatic
conference. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369
(1997) (describing the WIPO conference and the maneuvering of the U.S. delegation). The
Berne Convention is an international treaty governing copyright and related rights. See Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
The United States did not join the Berne Convention until 1989, when the treaty was over a
century old. See Berne Convention Enabling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988); see also Jane C. Ginsburg & John Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later: The
U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1988).
202- See Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 225.
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disease, as interjurisdictional collusion regarding law products could
seek to forestall competition by imposing a uniform international
standard for the product.
Much like a classic private-sector economic cartel, governments
that participate in an international intellectual property agreement
may be able to avoid ruinous competition in the market for law as a
good. By standardizing the law product, they may succeed in
effectively fixing the price for business migration. In the Internet
context, enforcement of high protectionist standards would prevent
cartel nations from lowering their "price" to attract information
distributors. Fixing the price for information distributor migration
would in turn allow domestic producers to avoid foreign information
competition, and engage in monopoly overcharge for information
products.203 This type of monopoly overcharge effectively taxes non-
producing nations-particularly developing nations-to support the
information producers of the developed world.2°4
Such collusive international activity may be highly advantageous
to politicians at the national level.2° First, through collusion with
foreign politicians, domestic politicians can protect themselves against
superior foreign law products.20 6 Exodus of firms to more attractive
regulatory regimes may place domestic politicians and bureaucrats
under pressure to streamline local regulation, perhaps at the expense
of favored but inefficient rent-seeking constituents. 20 7  Such
streamlining may, however, be avoided by agreement with foreign
counterparts to cooperate in suppressing formulation of more
efficient regulation in their respective jurisdictions.20 8
At the same time, local politicians may use an international
agreement to deflect domestic voter dissatisfaction over domestic
special interest legislation, by characterizing the local protectionist
measures as a necessary part of international cooperation.20 9 This in
essence facilitates intrajurisdictional externalization of regulatory
costs: rather than shifting costs to other jurisdictions, costs are shifted
to a different constituency within the jurisdiction.210  Thus,
203. See id. at 39.
204. Cf. id. (discussing monopoly overcharge as a form of taxation).
205. See Vaubel, supra note 177, at 32.
206. See id. at 32-33.
207. See Breton, supra note 123, at 39-40.
208. See Vaubel, supra note 177, at 33.
209. See id.
210. See Trachtman, supra note 152, at 57.
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international collusion may prevent both "voice" and "exit" from
correcting political improvidence. 211
Elements of both these political ploys seem apparent in the
recent debate over the Clinton administration's "White Paper"
copyright legislation.212  As mentioned above, these proposed
amendments to the Copyright Act appear strongly partisan, favoring
information producers over information distributors and consumers.
Administration officials sponsoring the legislation spoke loudly of the
need for the United States to show copyright law "leadership" before
the international community.2 3 In Congressional hearings on the
domestic legislation, WIPO officials were paraded before the
legislature to certify the importance and necessity of the amendments
as part of international cooperation.214 When attempts at domestic
legislation failed, the same U.S. politicians sponsoring the domestic
amendments introduced the proposals into the WIPO process for
revising the Berne Convention.215 This latter move appears to have
been an attempt to bring the proposals in through a back door, by re-
introducing them into Congress for ratification as part of a negotiated
treaty.216
However, the success of U.S. protectionists, or any other group
of price-fixers, requires a stable cartel, and cartels of any sort are
notoriously unstable.21 7 Such instability results in part from a form of
Prisoner's Dilemma or race to the bottom effect.218 Cartels extract
monopoly profits by agreeing to restrain output so as to be able to
push prices to monopoly levels that would be impossible to maintain
if the members engaged in production at competitive levels. Cartel
members therefore have a strong incentive to cheat: if a cartel
member engages at competitive level production while competitors
restrain output, the cheater can reap enormous profits. 219 But since all
211. See Vaubel, supra note 177, at 34.
212. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3.
213. See Samuelson, supra note 201, at 430.
214. See NIl Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 53, 65 (1995) (statement of Mihily Ficsor, Assistant Director
General, World Intellectual Property Organization).
215. See Samuelson, supra note 201, at 374-75.
216. See id. After several incarnations, domestic legislation purportedly designed to
implement the terms of the WIPO copyright treaty was enacted as the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
217. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1977).
218. See PINDYK & RUBENFELD, supra note 50, at 447, 456.
219. See id.
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members of the cartel are tempted by this same possibility, one
member is unlikely to be able to cheat without triggering cheating by
all the other members, leading back to competitive pricing and loss of
the profits that prompted the cheating.2 0 These effects become
increasingly prevalent the larger the number of members in the cartel,
as monitoring other member's compliance becomes increasingly
difficult with larger membership. 221
In the case of private economic cartels, a collusive organization is
believed to be most feasible and stable where the quality of the
product is homogeneous, the price elasticity of demand for the
product is low, barriers to entry are high, all suppliers of the product
have similar cost functions, and there is a dominant supplier who can
act as price-leader. 222 In the case of international collusion over
intellectual property law products, several of these requirements may
be met.
First, it would appear that the universe of law producers on an
international scale is largely closed, forming something of a barrier to
entry. New nations do not arise with particular frequency, and when
they do, the circumstances of their inauguration -such as revolution
or social upheaval-will likely deter information producers from
relocating to take advantage of whatever new law products they
choose to offer. Additionally, accumulation of legal capital poses a
barrier to jurisdictions attempting to enter the law product market.
In Romano's analysis of the race to the top for incorporation law,
firms that incorporated in Delaware repeatedly referred to the large
body of settled case law on corporations as a reason for incorporating
there. 223 Similarly, nations with a long history of well-developed
copyright law may be especially attractive to information distributors
seeking to locate their operations, especially if the jurisdiction sports
specialty courts with a high degree of expertise in copyright. The
certainty offered by a well-developed body of copyright law may in
many instances offer greater business value than would relaxed
regulation of information distribution. New entrants into the
information law market may have their work cut out for them in
order to displace the law products of well-established jurisdictions.224
220. See POSNER, supra note 102, at 286.
221. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 156, at 231; TAYLOR, supra note 159, at 105.
222. See Vaubel, supra note 177, at 33.
223. See ROMANO, supra note 118, at 258-61, 274-75.
224. Cf. ROMANO, supra note 118, at 40. ("Legal capital is not as easily duplicated by other
states.., because of the start-up costs in developing precedent and the dynamic precedent-
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Price-leadership or "dominant firm" effects may also be seen in
the market for intellectual property law. The number of sovereign
states is relatively large, but certain nations, particularly the United
States, are able to exert considerable diplomatic and economic
pressure toward conformity.225 In this regard, it is worth noting that in
pressing its "White Paper" recommendations to WIPO, the United
States appears suspiciously like a supplier attempting to act as "price-
leader" in the market for intellectual property law. By promulgating
its new "White Paper" copyright law products as a proposed standard
for inclusion within the Berne treaty revisions, the United States was
attempting to coordinate the international market for such law
products.
Barriers to product substitution may also exist. The price
elasticity of demand for law products has in the past been tied to firm
location, depending on the type of law in question. As noted above,
the incorporation law of one state may be an acceptable substitute for
that of another, because a firm need not physically move to make the
substitution. However, when firms must physically move to substitute
law "products," they may be locked into one legal standard by the
cost of migration. The Internet itself, by increasing firm mobility,
increases the ability of law "purchasers" to substitute one
jurisdiction's law product for another's. By substantially lowering or
eliminating that cost, the Internet destabilizes the ability of nations to
collectively set an international standard for intellectual property law.
If the conditions for a stable intergovernmental cartel can be
attained, the expected damage to innovation and competition will
follow naturally from the principles outlined previously in this article.
First, by homogenizing national intellectual property systems, an
international agreement forces international businesses to operate in
a world where "one size fits all." Opportunities for jurisdictional
experimentation and innovation are curtailed.226 New information
industries that might have arisen under innovative schemes may be
stifled. Established information industries will be confined to an
international norm, rather than offered the opportunity to select from
a diversity of systems that which is best suited to their operation. As
based nature of adjudication by courts.")
225. See Gana, supra note 99; Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic,
Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 615-16 (1996); J.H. Reichman,
Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and
International Trade After the GA TT's Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK J. INT'L L. 75, 113 (1993).
226. See Vaubel, supra note 177, at 29.
[Vol. 73:943
1998] VIRTUAL EXIT IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 985
a corollary effect, information firms will be exposed to greater
business risk because they will be less able to diversify across
jurisdictions. 27 Thus, the international inefficiencies resulting from
an international intellectual property cartel may be no less serious
than the inefficiencies resulting from lack of coordination.
V. CENTRALIZATION
We have explored how, in some situations, certain types of
defection may be desirable in order to create interjurisdictional law
competition, but how other types of defection may lead to an
undesirable race to externalize. If in fact co-operative strategies
prove impossible or unworkable, rational competitors may have yet
another option. If "horizontal" cooperation among jurisdictions
proves unstable, the creation of a "third party" standing in a vertical
relationship to the competitors may be necessary.228  Tiebout
recognized this in his original model by noting that where
externalities exist, centralized decisionmaking, rather than
interjurisdictional competition, may be required to achieve an
efficient outcome. This principle may also be stated in game theoretic
terms: because states know that their own rational short-term
competitive preferences will inevitably lead to their own detriment in
the long term, states may choose to voluntarily surrender all or part
of their decision-making power to a third party.
The "third party" approach is in essence the strategy adopted by
the individual states of the United States in acquiescing to the
constitutional compact that creates a centralized federal
government;229 similar benefits may be found in the federal compacts
of Canada and Australia,230 and to some extent that of the European
Community.2' Interestingly, it is also much the strategy adopted by
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") signatory
nations in creating the World Trade Organization ("WTO").232
227. See id.
228. See Breton, supra note 123, at 48-49.
229. See generally Jaques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of
the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1994).
230. See generally M.J. SPROULE, PUBLIC CHOICE IN FEDERALISM IN AUSTRALIA AND
CANADA (1975).
231. See James M. Buchanan, Federalism and Individual Sovereignty, 15 CATO J. 259, 266-67
(1995-96) (discussing federal structure of European Union central governance).
232. See Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Coverage and Procedures
of the WTO Understanding, 12 J. ARB. 81 (1995). The WTO is the trade dispute resolution
mechanism resulting from the culminating round of negotiations in the multilateral General
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However, any movement toward centralization should preserve to the
extent possible the benefits of interjurisdictional legal diversity. For
example, in the United States, the benefits of interstate competition
have also been preserved to the extent deemed practical. 233 Because
competitive benefits will be lost in whichever markets are centralized,
centralization must be considered a drastic measure to be taken only
where no such efficiencies are to be had; that is, where externalities
prevent the development of competition in the first instance. 234
Therefore, international centralization for Internet-related
information rights should likewise be approached with a minimalist
attitude, if at all. This requires a careful consideration of which areas
truly generate externalities that would undermine information
product creation, and limitation of the central authority to those
areas.235
A. Approaches to Centralization
Centralization of regulatory authority may take a number of
forms. The thought of "centralization" is perhaps most commonly
associated with direct regulation of the externality-producing
activity.236  However, centralized regulation of international
intellectual property protection is probably neither practical nor
desirable. Aside from the practical problems of convincing sovereign
nations to cede authority over a highly lucrative market, direct
regulation is most unlikely. In many instances, such centralization
simply moves the same public choice inefficiencies of the regional
government to a higher and more far-reaching regime-and in the
case of an international authority, "exit" to another regime would not
be available as a threat to curtail rent-seeking.
An alternative to direct regulation is to have the higher-level
authority set minimum standards, leaving the implementation to
regional governments. 237 This is in effect the approach under the
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994); see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (United States ratification and implementation of WTO agreements).
233. See Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1454 (1987).
234. Cf Breton, supra note 123, at 46.
235. See generally POSNER, supra note 102.
236. See Robert C. Ellickson, Public Property Rights: Vicarious Intergovernmental Rights
and Liabilities as a Technique for Correcting Intergovernmental Spillovers, in ESSAYS ON THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 49 (Daniel L. Rubinfeld ed., 1979).
237. See Breton, supra note 123, at 50.
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international Berne convention on copyright, which sets threshold
copyright requirements for member states. These minimum
standards form a "floor" to contain an information distribution "race
to the bottom." However, some degree of local innovation is still
permissible, so long as it lies above the level required by the
convention. So long as the minimum standards are in fact minimum,
prices in both the market for intellectual property and in the market
for intellectual property law are supported at the level necessary for
efficient production.
Once such standards are in place, the question remains as to how
they are to be enforced. The most desirable sort of centralized
"enforcement" may be the implementation of grants-in-aid to counter
jurisdictional spillovers.28 Under this approach, the central authority
monitors regional activity for public goods spillovers, and then offers
grants to local authorities to offset their external effects of local
activity. 239 Positive externalities may be subsidized so that the local
authority will not underproduce a public good that could benefit
those outside the jurisdiction, but who otherwise could not be
induced to pay for the good.24° Alternatively, jurisdictions may be
"bribed" not to engage in activities that generate negative
externalities. 241 Grants are given to offset the local revenues that
might be gained at the expense of non-residents in an
interjurisdictional "race to externalize." This latter type of grant
might be especially appropriate to forestall the Internet externality
problem. An organization such as the World Bank or International
Monetary Fund could offer payments to developing nations that
might otherwise gain revenue through information product piracy.
Payments might be tied to the level of intellectual property protection
available and enforced in the recipient nation.
This type of program could in fact implement a form of exchange
predicted by the famous Coase Theorem. 242 For example, yearly
estimates of the Pacific rim sales lost by U.S. industries due to
Chinese information product piracy range into the hundreds of
238. See generally WALLACE OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972).
239. See Therese J. McGuire, Federal Aid to States and Localities and the Appropriate
Competitive Framework, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
EFFICIENCY, supra note 123, at 153, 159.
240. See id.
241. See Breton, supra note 123, at 50-51.
242. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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millions of dollars.243 We have shown here how the proliferation of
the Internet may well exacerbate that trend by removing or lowering
the pirate's cost of transporting physical media. Under a Coasean
analysis, U.S. information producers might cheerfully pay Chinese
information distributors some "bribe" up to the expected value of the
lost sales in order to induce the Chinese to stop pirating. Of course,
such an arrangement involves extensive coordination and transaction
costs, that might well block the exchange from occurring. However,
these costs might be lowered substantially by reducing the number of
parties to the exchange such as by arranging for an international fund
to pay the Chinese government to vigorously enforce international
standards of intellectual property protection.
Although this might prove to be the most efficient type of
solution to the Internet externality problem, I also consider it to be
the most unlikely to be implemented, primarily due to the public
choice analysis reviewed above. It may be far cheaper for U.S.
information producers to engage in rent-seeking than for them to
engage in grant-funding. For the price of a few thousand dollar's
contribution to political campaign funds, information producers can
likely induce domestic politicians to engage in diplomatic pressure, or
even an all-out trade war,244 to prevent foreign piracy-indeed, the
industry lobbyists may even be invited to stay in the Lincoln bedroom
as part of the bargain.2 45 From the domestic politician's point of view,
diplomatic or economic saber-rattling is likely to be far more popular
than funding a grant program to maximize global utility.
Consequently, prospects for this type of international cooperation
seem dim.
A second and more feasible centralized mechanism for
controlling Internet externalities might be implementation of what
Robert Ellickson has called "public property rights. ' 246 Under this
approach, the central authority makes lower-level governments
vicariously responsible for the externality-generating activities of
their private constituents.2 47 The governments then represent the real
243. See generally Simpson, supra note 190.
244. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, U.S.-Europe Trade War Looms Over Bananas, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 1998 at Al (political contributors Dole and Chiquita here made bananas a Washington
trade policy priority).
245. See Michael Weisskopf & Charles R. Babcock, Donors Pay and Stay at the White
House: Lincoln Bedroom a Special Treat, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1996, at A01.
246. See generally Ellickson, supra note 236.
247. See generally id. at 53-54.
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parties in interest in any negotiation or litigation over harm accruing
from the activity. This system may be desirable where coordination
costs make impractical assignment of rights and liabilities to private
parties.248 Although public representatives might not pursue cost
internalization as assiduously or efficiently as private owners might, it
will be in their interests to do so in egregious or prominent instances
of harmful interjurisdictional spillover.
Prospects for initiating such a system seem relatively favorable,
as the elements of this system are already in place in the World Trade
Organization. The WTO dispute resolution mechanism does not
entertain complaints by private entities who are harmed by unfair
trade practices, but rather by governments representing such
interests.249 Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), WTO members are required
to adhere to the copyright standards of the Berne convention.25 0
Violation of the Berne minimum standards can thus lead to initiation
of a WTO proceeding, resulting in trade retaliation or payment of
sanctions against the non-complying nation.251 The ready availability
of this mechanism offers a potentially satisfactory enforcement
mechanism provided that the incorporated Berne provisions are in
fact suitable "minimum standards" against Internet spillovers.
B. Defining the Standard
The suitability of the Berne copyright standards as a "floor" to
forestall Internet externalities remains an open question. On the one
hand, to the extent that copyright law was formulated to exploit the
cost of distributing physical media, it may be seriously deficient in
addressing digital works. This militates in favor of revising
international copyright law to consider digital works, as was recently
done in a diplomatic summit hosted by the WIPO. On the other
hand, recent commentary concerning the WIPO diplomatic
248. See id. at 69.
249. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997).
250. See Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 480 (1997); Jerome H. Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the
WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L L. 345 (1995).
251. See Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 29 INT'L L. 99 (1995); Netanel, supra note 250; Adrian Otten &
Hannu Wager, Compliance With TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 391 (1996).
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conference depicts the meeting as an exercise in special interest rent-
seeking, and I have shown here that such activity is consistent with
some rather unflattering public choice models of public officials'
behavior. Thus, there exists a strong possibility that the Berne
"minimum" standards could become an instrument for collusive
international behavior to set excessive monopoly rents in both the
market for intellectual property law and the market for intellectual
property.
If this result is to be avoided, the Berne standards will require
careful calibration. I shall spend the balance of this article showing
that, as a practical matter, legal "minimum standards" need not be set
very high to counter undesirable Internet "spillovers," and will likely
be necessary only for selected types of digital works. In other areas,
sufficient barriers remain to effectively prevent many information
products from becoming general public goods, and so long as they
remain local public goods, competitive mechanisms can be allowed to
function.
1. Barriers to Entry
Although the Internet promises to lower distance barriers, other
economic barriers may help maintain sufficient compartmentalization
that precipitous international action need not be taken, at least not
yet. As mentioned above, there are effective barriers to entering the
market for intellectual property law. These barriers would likely tend
to favor developed information producing nations such as the United
States over developing nations with immature information law
precedents. Of course, the unsettled nature of law on the Internet
may blunt this comparative advantage; to the extent that production
of "cyberlaw" represents entry into a new market, no nation yet
enjoys a unassailable market share. However, the existence in some
nations of courts with a developed expertise in copyright and related
law could offer a significant advantage even in the absence of
precedential decisions directly addressed to the Internet. This may
mean that a stampede of firms to permissive but untried jurisdictions
will not develop.
Second, compartmentalization among jurisdictions may be
sustainable because of non-legal factors. Law is in many senses a
"bundled" product-the decision to "exit" for an alternative venue
will be made on the totality of the public goods package offered off-
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shore.2 2 Even if a permissive intellectual property law product is
offered, other regulation in that jurisdiction will be taken into
account, and may outweigh the competitiveness of the intellectual
property offering. Indeed, non-legal "factor endowments" such as
climate or quality of life may be in essence bundled with the
intellectual property law product of the jurisdiction. Restrictive
intellectual property jurisdictions may be able to remain competitive
if their total package of taxes, climate, labor regulation, import duties,
and other local public goods remains attractive. Such limitations may
turn the "race for the bottom" into a leisurely stroll, or forestall it
altogether.
2. Presentation Barriers
Similarly, with regard to the market for intellectual property
itself, there may be no stampede of consumers to off-shore providers
because of barriers of presentation.2 13 In many instances, consumers
may continue to prefer to obtain works in tangible embodiments that
are subject to Loschian constraints. For example, a common
complaint regarding on-line reading material is the inconvenience of
moving between screens; it is difficult to "skim" or quickly "thumb
through" the displayed material as compared to a hard-copy
version.u 4 Even the most compact notebook computer is fairly
awkward and bulky compared to a paperback book; until the advent
of some major and ubiquitous advance in flat-panel technology, this
will likely remain the case.255 And, even with rising printing costs, the
present price of a paperback is difficult to beat.256 Thus, it seems
unlikely that novels downloaded off the Internet will displace books
for pleasure reading in the near future: readers curling up on the sofa
with a palm-top computer and a large mug of cocoa is not a scenario
that the publishing industry need fear.257
Of course, many of these presentation barriers may be overcome
as the separate home appliances of computer, stereo, and television
252. See generally Rose-Ackerman, supra note 122; Trachtman, supra note 152, at 79.
253. See I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright, and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. (1995) <http://www.urich.edu/-jolt/vl.1/hardy.html>.
254. See NEGROPONTE, supra note 20, at 13.
255. See Laura Van Dam, A Never Ending Story, TECH. REV., Mar.-June 1996, at 12
(describing development of a flexible panel electronic "book").
256. See NEGROPONTE, supra note 20, at 13; see also Philip Yam, Plastics Get Wired, SC.
AM., July 1995, at 83-84 (price of conducting polymers still prohibits flexible panel displays).
257. See NEGROPONTE, supra note 20, at 7.
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begin to merge, allowing seamless transfer of digital works between
video, audio, and information processing systems. But that
convergence has not happened yet. At least for the present, though,
it appears that the Internet has not magically transformed aesthetic
and entertainment works into general public goods-quite the
contrary, the particular embodiment of such works remains an
important aspect of consumer enjoyment, and the preferred
embodiments continue to show characteristics of local public goods.
So long as this remains true, "spillover" into other jurisdictions may
be containable.
For other classes of copyrighted works, however, present
computer presentation formats will remain perfectly acceptable. Such
works might include databases, factual or instructional documents,
and, of course, computer software. Because such works are not
intended to be enjoyed aesthetically, the presentation format is less
important to consumers than the works' content. Interestingly, such
"utilitarian" works tend to be those not traditionally protected by
copyright, and hence those works for which copyright protection is
most problematic or "thin. ' '218 Nonetheless they appear to be the type
of works that will most closely resemble general public goods in
Internet commerce; consequently, some special provision for such
works may be in order.
3. Technological Barriers
Information goods that entail presentation barriers have aspects
of private goods because consumers value a particular embodiment
that may not be available in a digitized format. This suggests that
there may be significant opportunities for self-help, that is, for
information producers to capture the value of their products without
resort to legal protection. In some instances, such opportunities may
constitute simple business devices, such as selling frequent updates or
upgrades to information products that are difficult to protect from
piracy-the cost of the investment in the hard-to-protect information
can be capitalized in the updates.159 This type of stratagem, long
known to lawyers as the "pocket part," is already becoming prevalent
258. See generally Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
259. See Tom Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 289-91 (1989) (discussing non-legal exclusion from public
goods).
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on the Internet.z6
Additionally, information goods of all types could perhaps be
imbued with private goods aspects via technological barriers.261
Passwords and other access barriers may be of some use, but once the
material is accessed, it may be copied by and distributed from the
user's system without restraint. What may be more useful is the use
of "secure systems" that prevent unauthorized end-user copying and
distribution.2 62  Technology now under consideration would allow
users to treat digital works much like physically embodied works,
including "loaning" or browsing the work without making a
permanent copy.263 Some types of secure systems could be used to
monitor the number of uses, charging users for the particular degree
of access that they desire.26
This approach restricts the ability of the user to reproduce or
distribute the information product, effectively imposing on the digital
product an "embodiment" with private good aspects. However, it
may prove a mixed blessing. First, if improperly used, this approach
could negate the many positive benefits of digital media. Information
users could possibly use secure systems to privately appropriate the
public value of information works that has traditionally been reserved
to the public domain.265 These systems may also entail some dangers
regarding the privacy of information used to manage the system.266
A second and closely related problem arises from the fact that
"the technology of exclusion is a growth industry with frequent
innovation.1267 For every technological lock, there is a key, and it is
possible that technically sophisticated users could circumvent secure
systems to widely distribute either the unauthorized circumvention
technology or the unlocked product itself. This of course, may
260. See John Perry Barlow, The Framework for Economy of Ideas: Rethinking Patents and
Copyrights in the Digital Age, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 83, 128-29; Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value,
WIRED, July 1995, at 136-38.
261. See Mark Stefik, Letting Loose the Light: Igniting Commerce in Electronic Publication,
in INTERNET DREAMS: ARCHETYPES, MYTHS, AND METAPHORS 219 (Mark Stefik ed., 1996);
Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge
Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (1997).
262. See Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, Sci. AM., Mar. 1997, at 43.
263. See id.
264. See Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws
Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997).
265. See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1091 (1995).
266. See generally Cohen, supra note 2.
267. See Hardin, supra note 170, at 28.
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prompt the innovation of a more sophisticated lock, prompting in
turn development of an unauthorized key to that system, and so on-
sort of secure systems arms race. To forestall such a race, information
producers have looked to create legal sanctions against circumvention
technology. However, legal standards to prevent this type of free-
riding must be tailored to the minimum in order to prevent
information producers from accruing excessive monopoly rents.
Overbroad legal protection of technical barriers could allow content
producers to capture intellectual goods beyond the optimum level
necessary to encourage creation.268
Additionally, given the considerations outlined in this article,
there appears to be a substantial likelihood that the enactment of
anti-circumvention law may itself trigger a race to externalize the
costs of a copyright management technology "arms race." The
presence of this ancillary race gives rise to a sort of fractal pattern of
virtual exit,269 where nested within the dynamic of interjurisdictional
competition for copyright law there lies an identical interjurisdictional
competition for technological circumvention law. As in the race for
copyright law, some of the externalities of the race for circumvention
law could be internalized by centralization or harmonization of anti-
circumvention standards, but the dangers of overreaching or rent-
seeking are equally present. The recent WIPO-sponsored
amendment to the Berne convention attempts to modulate the race
for circumvention law by requiring signatory nations to adopt
effective legal protection against circumvention.270 However, the
implementation of this obligation may vary widely among signatory
nations.271 Additionally, some jurisdictions may choose to defect from
the WIPO agreement, becoming circumvention havens. The option
of virtual exit to such havens may help curtail overreaching by
content providers who employ technological barriers, but as in the
case of the market for copyright law, such defections could also
268. For example, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) declares the availability of
fair use for digital works, but then essentially negates this declaration by penalizing
unauthorized access to technologically protected works-in effect, giving users of
technologically protected works little or no opportunity to exercise their right of fair use. See
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, § 103 (Oct. 1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201).
269. See generally BENOLT B. MANDELBROT, THE FRAcTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE
(1983) (describing fractal geometry).
270. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65.
271. For example, some commentators have suggested that the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA were unnecessary to put the United States into compliance with the
WIPO treaty requirements; our existing caselaw on contributory infringement would have been
adequate. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 264, at 169 n.31 (quoting Professor Samuelson).
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undermine the benefits of the system as a whole.
CONCLUSION
The Internet promises to facilitate both trans-border delivery of
information products and trans-border migration of information
producers. Thus, the competitive effects of the Internet may prove a
mixed blessing, depending on one's perspective. The challenge will
be to preserve the competitive benefits enabled by the network, while
minimizing its externalizing effects. To meet that challenge, a
carefully crafted international agreement on copyright and
information policy may be necessary. However, given the potential
for international collusion via such regulatory centralization, any
agreement should leave maximum opportunity for jurisdictional
experimentation and variation. This likely means doing no more than
specifying minimum standards for copyright protection by the
signatories, and providing an appropriate mechanism for enforcement
of egregious violations. Interestingly enough, this is already the
approach taken by both the Berne Convention and, by incorporation
of the Berne standards into the TRIPS agreements, the approach of
the WTO. Thus the sensible approach at present may simply be to
seek increased enrollment in existing agreements, rather than new or
drastically modified agreements. Only by striking the proper balance
between mobility and compartmentalization can such an agreement
preserve both voice and exit in the virtual marketplace.

